Points of Praxis

My Blog Reflects on Visual Rhetorical Theory and Disability Rhetoric and their Connections to Classical and Contemporary Rhetorical Theory

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Friday, January 05, 2007

Some good points to remember:

Daniel Chandler writes in The Basics: Semiotics, "From Plato to Levi-Strauss, the spoken word has held a privileged position in the Western worldview, being regarded as intimately involved in our sense of self and constituting a sign of truth and authenticity" (51).

Helmers and Hill discuss the scope and importance of studies in visual rhetoric and the "seemingly infinite range of possibilities for those who are interested in studying rhetorical transactions of all kinds" (21).

Saussure's theory of opposites--knowing what "it" is by what "it" isn't. Going back to semoitics, deletion is a syntagmatic (surface-level) transformation that shapes the constructed meaning of a sign, also.

images or visuals are not argument or persuasion; rather, the contexts in which images are placed make them persuasive, rhetoric, or argumentative. [Mitchell agrees w/ this statement in Picture Theory and Paul Messaris in Visual Literacy would argue that we've been trained to see images as visually persuasive or an argument]

"the visual brings to arguments another dimension entirely. It adds drama and force of a much greater order" (Hill and Helmers 59).

Barry argues that emotional responses are a priori to rational understanding. I'm thinking here of her discussion on page 18 of how we begin to respond emotionally to situations before we begin to *think* through them.

"Information that is expressed either in visual form or in a verbal form that promotes the construction of mental images is more likely to instantiate these emotions and to be given additional persuasive weight" (36).

images can even be used to prompt sustained, analytic thinking. Images, like verbal text, can be used to prompt an immediate, visceral response, to develop cognitive (though largely unconscious) connections over a sustained period of time, or to prompt conscious analytical thought" (Hill 37).

Eco writes that meaning is constructed through equivalence and inference: meaning is constructed by understanding what something is similar to (equivalence) or what it could be, specifically "If/Then" scenarios (inference). However, meaning or content is a cultural unit positioned within a system (31). Meaning isn't constructed devoid of contexts. Signs are dynamic and changing "objects" that motivates and are motivated by other signs. Abductive reasoning then is similar to the "snake eating its tail" metaphor that Barry describes in Chapter 2 on page 87.

So, whereas inductive reasoning begins with the specific and formulates the rule based on the specific, abductive reasoning also includes the rule to formulate the specific (I hope this makes sense). It reminds me of Barry's discussion on visual perception and expectations. (We think we see an old woman in the picture. After knowing it's a from a book on the elderly, we know it's a picture of an old woman.) The specific creates the rule, but the rule also in turn creates the specific.

Alright, so how does all of this relate back to Barry? I was reminded of Eco time and time again in her discussion on the various influences on perception--for example, the influences from our senses. Specifically, Barry writes that "visual, verbal and mental images, tied to our experience of and in the world, are nevertheless experientially related--whether they reflect the superficial appearance of the world or a mental images abstracted from it" (Barry 74).

The ways in which we construct meaning or perceive the world isn't simply input-in, output-out. Or, "the eye is not a passive camera, so images are never merely replicas, but often reflect deep and significant processes in the psyche" (Barry 76). Just as Eco argued that we can't neglect the circular nature of "knowledge," we can't forget the role of the "observer" who doesn't just observe passively: "When the mind of the observer is ignored, the transcendent power of analogy is likewise nullified" (Barry 77).

Eco echos (pun intended) Barry's point that perception occurs through multiple stimuli. Barry writes, "Meaningfulness was to be found in the reaction among the elements and in the relationship which formed a unified whole, not in the separate parts themselves" (Barry 44).

In Janis L. Edwards' article, she discusses the nation's collective memories of JFK, his assassination, and the accidental death of his son, John F. Kennedy, Jr., specifically, arguing that the coverage of John, Jr.'s death was mythically connected through collective memory to that of JFK's funeral and John, Jr.'s "salute." This photograph, of John, Jr. "saluting" his father funeral procession, became an iconic symbol of the contrasts between "innocent idealism with violent reality" (184).

However, what I find interesting are the ways in which such iconic images become part of the collective memories of viewers--viewers who never saw the "actual" event but only remember it through photographs and film footage. Daniel Chambers defines "iconic" as "a mode in which the signifier is perceived as resembling or imitating the signified (recognizably looking, sounding, feeling, tasting or smelling like it)" (229). In other words, the iconic image is one that seems to "realistically" reflect its referent; the image of John, Jr. saluting is iconic because it reflects accurately what happened in November 1963.

However, I believe that collective memories often create these iconic images. After all, how many "remember" seeing John, Jr. salute his father's funeral procession? Or, "remember" seeing the Challenger explode on January 28, 1986? And, while these memories seem ingrained in our collective consciousness, Marita Struken discusses in her book _Tangled Memories_ that collective memories are often forged. Often times, we "remember" the events like they happened, even though we never actually saw them with our own eyes at the moment they occurred. Looking at Edwards' discussion in light of Struken's, I would argue then that because these collective memories don't actually reflect "reality" or what we really saw, they become symbolic images--or images that "does not resemble the signified but which is arbitrary or purely conventional, so that the relationship must be learned" (243). In other words, I recognize the image of John, Jr. saluting because I've learned over the numerous occasions that I saw it on television that that's what it is. I never saw it happen myself--it's only a symbolic image for me. Not an iconic one. If some images are "symbolic" and others are "iconic" this leaves much more to discuss in regard to images and collective memories. How much of what we know and understand is really authentic? Seeing isn't necessarily knowing. Therefore, collective memories and symbolic images are falable, chaotic, and dynamic.


Foss's application of print rhetorical theories to visual artifacts. Specifically, Foss begins her discussion on the rhetorical tradition of priviledging linguistic artifacts over visual (303). Although Foss doesn't mention Plato, I was reminded of Plato's criticism of print texts over memory. Memory relies on linguistic "tricks" whereas print texts are essentially linguistic texts in a visual form. Print texts are visual rhetoric, in some regard.

Also, much of Foss's theory is based on classical rhetorical theories; she discusses how artifacts function as "metaphor, argument, enthymeme, ethos, evidence, narrative, and stasis" (308).  Foss also discusses two approaches to visual rhetorical criticism: inductive and deductive applications. Even Foss article, presented at the end of the book, is a deductive approach to visual rhetorical theory. The authors present their interpretations of various visual media and artifacts, and Foss presents a method for analyzing such artifacts (just like the method she discusses in her section on deductive applications).

I think Foss is giving scholars a "do-able" approach to visual rhetorical theory. But, I wonder if, as Foss notes, visual rhetoric is a "relevant, inclusive, and holistic [view] of contemporary symbol use" (313) and field of study that requires different, inclusive, non-linear rhetorical approaches, whether framing her discussion in a classical rhetorical tradition is the way to achieve this? To answer my own question, I would have to say that there has to be a place to begin. If visual rhetoric is still an emerging field that is often "bastardized" in more traditional English departments, then connecting visual rhetoric to the classical rhetorical tradition would help legitamize the field.

posted by: rgregory at 03:30 | link | comments |

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